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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Is the sanction of dismissal an appropriate remedy under the 1999 Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure where there was no violation of a court order, where Rule 37(f) does not 
apply to the case, and where there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between a 
photograph and a videotape? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Utah Dept ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995), this court 
reviews imposition of discovery sanctions based on whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule Civil Procedure 37 (1999) applies to this case. Rule 37 is attached as 
Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case originally arose as a result of Philip Coxey's exposure to electrical 
current at the Federal Order of Eagle's Campground in Ogden Valley in May of 1997. 
Mr. Coxey's exposure lasted anywhere from 5 to 25 seconds and left him with significant 
memory deficits. Mr. Coxey, unable to return to work as a police officer due to his 
injury, filed suit in October 1998. The matter originally went to trial on June 17, 2002. A 
jury returned a no-cause verdict. Because Defendant offered previously undisclosed 
expert witness testimony at trial Plaintiffs former counsel, Ronald Perkins, filed a motion 
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for new trial in August 2002. The trial court granted the motion for new trial because 
Plaintiff was "unfairly surprised" by the presentation of expert witness testimony. The 
court further recognized that Plaintiff "exercised ordinary prudence" by seeking to elicit 
the existence of any testifying experts through a formal and specific discovery request. 
After granting a new trial, rather than imposing a default against Defendant for their non-
disclosure, Mr. Coxey retained current counsel of record. 
One week before the new trial was set to begin, current counsel obtained from 
Plaintiffs former counsel a videotape displaying the campground. Current counsel, 
knowing that the trial court had already ruled that only certain scenes of the campground 
could be displayed before the jury, had still prints made from the videotape which did not 
depict the objectionable scenes. Defense, on learning of the existence of the videotape 
during the first day of trial, requested that the case be dismissed for failure to disclose the 
videotape pursuant to an interrogatory requesting relevant photographs. Plaintiff argued 
that the trial should be reset and thereby give Defendant opportunity to cure any 
prejudice. The trial court refused and, instead, dismissed Plaintiffs case on the second 
day of trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Philip Coxey was shocked while at the Federal Order of the Eagles Campground in 
May of 1997. As a result of an improperly wired electrical outlet, Mr. Coxey received a 
shock for as much as 25 seconds. After the incident, Mr. Coxey experienced memory 
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deficit and lingering mental difficulties. The effects of the electrocution further forced 
Mr. Coxey into leaving his position as a police officer with Ogden City. Mr. Coxey 
brought suit against FOE seeking compensation for his injuries, medical expenses and his 
lost wages. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lack of production of the videotape during discovery does not warrant the 
extreme sanction of dismissal under rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The sanction is not an appropriate remedy without violation of a court order. The trial 
court also relied on rule 37(f) in imposing the sanction. This was improper because the 
rule was not in effect at the time the case was filed. Even if the imposing Rule 37 
sanctions was proper in this case, the sanction of dismissal is too harsh given the 
possibility for distinguishing between a photograph and a videotape upon a discovery 
request. Considering these arguments, the sanction of dismissal is not warranted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABSENT VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER, 
SANCTIONS UNDER UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 37(B)(2) ARE INAPPROPRIATE. 
Absent violation of a court order, courts do not impose the extreme sanction of 
dismissal. "A trial court's power to sanction a party for failure to cooperate in discovery 
comes from rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Berrett v. Denver and 
Rio Grande Western R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 294 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The general 
3 
rule is that a party in a civil case who refuses to respond to an order compelling discovery 
is subject to sanctions pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C). "The 
sanctions are intended to deter misconduct in connection with discovery ... and require a 
showing of 'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' on the part of the noncomplying party.... The 
choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the responsibility of the trial 
judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). The trial court cited Osguthorpe in support of 
imposing dismissal as a sanction. However, Osguthorpe requires that, prior to imposition 
of sanctions, there be a violation of a court order. In the present case, the trial court did 
not set a discovery order, as admitted by the Defense (R. 617). In fact, the trial court set 
no order whatsoever (R. 617). Since there was no court order, the trial court should not 
have imposed sanctions pursuant to rule 37(b)(2), including the extreme sanction of 
dismissal. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE WHICH DID NOT GOVERN THE CASE AT 
BAR. 
In the instant case, the court noted that rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states in pertinent part that if there is a failure to disclose: "that party shall not 
be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In 
addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including 
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payment of reasonable costs and attorneys fees, any order permitted under subpart 
(b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of the failure to disclose." 
The trial court's use of Rule 37(f) was inappropriate since the Rule had not yet 
been adopted at the time this case was filed. The case was filed on October 16, 1998 (R. 
p. 1), but the application of the 1999 rules did not begin until November 1, 1999. "The 
Supreme Court order approving the amendments [adopting new Utah R. Civ. P. 37] 
directed that the new procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 
1999." Utah R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee notes (West 2003). Therefore, the trial 
court erred in imposing the sanction of dismissal, and the case should be remanded for a 
new trial. 
III. THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF DISCOVERY RULES 
SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE EXTREME 
SANCTION OF DISMISSAL. 
Even if Rule 37 sanctions applied in this case, which they do not because there was 
no set discovery order, the sanction of dismissal is too harsh considering the possibility 
for distinguishing between a photograph and a videotape. Thus, the trial court abused its 
discretion in imposing the extreme sanction of dismissal because there was no violation 
of discovery rules sufficient to warrant such a sanction. According to Osguthorpe, trial 
courts have discretion to impose a suitable sanction for violation of discovery rules based 
on "willfulness, bad faith, or fault." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6. The trial court found that 
Plaintiffs failure to produce the videotape at discovery was sufficiently egregious to 
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warrant the extreme sanction of dismissal (R. 858-867). Although the trial court 
dismissed the distinction between a photograph and a videotape as a "specious" argument 
(R. 864), at least two factors indicate that such a distinction is warranted. 
First, the defendant used the term "videotape" in other interrogatories, implying 
that if defendant desired a videotape for purposes of discovery, defendant would have 
specifically asked for one. Specifically, as requested by the defense, plaintiff and his 
prior counsel produced all photographs in the Plaintiffs possession (R. 678-691). At no 
time was the Plaintiff or his prior counsel requested to produce any videotape of his 
injuries or the campground or trailers, rather only photographs (R. 678-682). The 
depositions of Mr. And Mrs. Coxey show that neither was ever asked about the existence 
of any videotape concerning the above subjects, they were only asked about photographs 
(R. 679-680, Request Nos. 4, 6, 7). Therefore, they were under no obligation to produce 
that which they were never asked for or about and have not concealed material 
information. 
Further, it is clear that the term "videotape" was used in regard to interviews 
conducted on behalf of the trial court, of which there were none (R. 681, Request No. 12). 
The use of the word "videotape" in a separate interrogatory clearly shows that the 
defendant had the opportunity to make such a request and had it requested photographs 
and/or videotapes of the injuries, trailers or scene, which it did not, the tape should have 
been produced. However, the request was never made (R. 678-682). Therefore, there 
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was no duty to produce the tape and no sanction is appropriate other than to grant a new 
trial to permit the defense to conduct the discovery about new evidence that it has asserted 
is material to its defense. Ruiz v. Hamburg-American Line 478 F.2d 29 (9th Cir.1973). 
Although there no Utah case law addresses the distinction between a photograph 
and a videotape, other jurisdictions have found that a distinction does exist. In Dallas v. 
Harrison, 759 S.W.2d 530, 531 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988), the court found that "the 
County's request for production of photographs did not include a request for production 
of the video tape at issue." The court based its holding on the separate listing of 
photographs and videotape recordings in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(2)(b)3 
indicating that they are "two separate items or types of documents" for purposes of 
discovery. Notably, Utah's sister rule to that cited in Harrison, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 34, does not give a separate listing for videotapes. However, the rule does 
require that "the request shall set forth the items to be inspected either by individual item 
or by category, and describe each item and category with reasonable particularity." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 34(b) (1999). Given the possibility of distinguishing between a photograph and 
videotape, "reasonable particularity" requires that the two items be requested separately. 
In sum, the sanction of dismissal is excessively harsh considering the potential for 
distinguishing between a photograph and a videotape, based both on the defendant's 
distinction in the interrogatories, on supporting case law, and on the requirement that 
items for discovery be enumerated with "reasonable particularity." 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE 
SCOPE OF THE NEW TRIAL BY EXCLUDING NEW 
WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE. 
The trial court should not have restricted the scope of the new trial by excluding 
new witnesses and evidence, including the presentation of Mr. Gnandt and Dr. Anden. 
"The order granting a new trial is not a final judgment, it but sets aside the verdict and 
places the parties in the same position as if there had been no previous trial." Haslam v. 
Paulsen, 389 P.2d 736, 736 (Utah 1964). In Hyland v. St Mark's Hospital, All P.2d 736 
(1967), a medical negligence case, the jury found that the hospital was not aegligent. The 
trial judge entered judgment for the plaintiff and ordered a new trial only on the issue of 
damages. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "Notwithstanding the fact that the 
trial court's ruling does not impress us as wholly unreasonable, out of a desire that a new 
trial be fair to both sides, we believe that justice would be best served by removing any 
restriction upon it. ... The questions relating to plaintiffs injury, how it happened, who 
was at fault, and the pain and injury occasioned thereby, are so intermingled that if there 
is to be a new trial, in fairness to both parties, it should be on all issues." Id. at 738. 
The United States Supreme Court case of Davis v. O'Hara, 266 U.S. 314 (1924) 
recognized that at a new trial "[t]here is no reason why a defense pleaded, but not urged at 
an earlier trial, may not be insisted upon at a new trial.5' Id. at 321. By necessity that 
means new witnesses or evidence may be presented that were not presented at a first trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned adding witnesses or evidence at a second 
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trial in Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), a motor vehicle accident case in 
which a second trial was granted. In the second trial, "an additional police officer, an 
additional accident reconstruction expert, and an eyewitness were added." Id. at 733. 
This position is consistent with considerations of fundamental fairness and the precedent 
of putting the parties in the same position as if there had been no previous trial. 
The preceding cases demonstrate that Plaintiff is not restricted to the evidence and 
testimony presented at the first trial and any ruling to the contrary imposes an 
unjustifiable prejudice on Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff requests that the Court allow 
presentation of Mr. Gnandt, designated five months before trial, Dr. Anden, designated 
nearly two months prior to trial (R. 617). 
Absent any prejudice to Defense, there can be no sound reason to exclude 
Plaintiffs expert witnesses in this case. It is not unfair to a party to allow the opposing 
party to call experts designated well in advance of trial, and well before the cut off under 
the applicable discovery rules. However, it is fundamentally unfair to limit, absent any 
grounds for doing so, the Plaintiffs ability to prove his case. The trial court's decision to 
not allow new evidence and witnesses is simply wrong and has the effect of prejudicing 
the Plaintiff s case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs case. The trial court did not have 
authority to impose sanctions under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) because there was 
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no violation of a discovery order, the court never having issued an order. Additionally, in 
imposing the sanction, the trial court relied on Rule 37(f) which was not in effect at the 
time Plaintiffs case was filed and therefore does not apply to Plaintiffs case. Even if 
Rule 37 sanctions applied in this case, the extreme sanction of dismissal is not warranted 
considering the possibility of distinguishing between a videotape and a photograph in a 
discovery request. Such a distinction is not precluded by case law and is especially 
warranted considering that the Defendant used both terms at different times in the 
interrogatories. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that this Court remand for a new trial. 
At the new trial, Plaintiff requests that he be allowed to use evidence not presented 
at the first proceeding, including expert witnesses. This is in accordance wilh established 
procedures for a second trial as a trial de novo in which additional evidence can be 
introduced. Nothing in Plaintiffs case indicates that the scope of the second trial should 
be restricted. The expert witnesses were selected well in advance of trial and simply 
allowing Plaintiff to prove his case is not prejudicial to the Defendant. Therefore, in 
fairness to Plaintiff, this court should grant a new trial allowing Plaintiff the opportunity 
to use expert witnesses to prove his case. 
Words do not exceed 2,800. 
DATED this _ day of _ 6 ± ± r ^ ^ ^ f 2004. 
JAMES R. HASENYA 
'Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM A 
97 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE KUie 6 i 
solely predicated on requested admissions, re-
sponse to that motion, which enumerated the 
arguments why the admissions should not be 
admitted, and movant's reply to the response 
all together outlined the respective positions on 
the question of withdrawal of admissions, and 
the trial court was fully briefed thereon; it 
properly treated the various documents as a 
motion to withdraw the admissions. Brunetti v. 
Mascaro, 854 R2d 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Matter of law 
Request for admission of pure matter of law 
is improper, although a request for an admis-
sion of an ultimate fact or application of law to 
fact is proper. Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., 
Inc., 702 P2d 98 (Utah 1985). 
Motion to dismiss 
—Tolling 
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect of 
Subdivision (a), which treats requests for ad-
missions which are not answered within 45 
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for 
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
Privilege against self-incrimination 
Privilege against self-incrimination may be 
asserted in civil discovery proceedings, includ-
ing requests for admission; however, to sustain 
an assertion of the privilege, a party must show 
that the responses sought to be compelled 
might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). 
Punitive damages 
Where plaintiff requests an admission of pu-
nitive damages in an amount unrelated to 
actual damages, the court, as a matter of eq-
uity, must intervene and examine the admis-
sion. Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 
P.2d 98 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151, 379 
P2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. 
Park W. Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110. 
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure tes-
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis-
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and 
rules, to respond to request for admission of 
facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
A.L.R.3d 756. 
Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
admissions under state discovery rules, 8 
A.L.R.4th 728. 
Permissible scope, respecting nature of in-
quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to 
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to 
the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, 
to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An application 
for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submit-
ted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a 
designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request 
for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be 
permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discov-
ering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or 
an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or 
adjourn the examination before he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made 
pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision an 
evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
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(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall, 
after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both 
of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require 
the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to 
the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses 
incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may apportion 
the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties 
and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent 
fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the 
court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be 
considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, 
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide 
or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule 
or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the 
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any 
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the 
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated 
matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order 
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order 
to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) 
requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in 
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to 
comply shows that he is unable to produce.such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both 
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, 
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit If a party fails to admit the genuineness of 
any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the 
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
99 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 37 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrog-
atories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take 
his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers 
or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service 
of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the 
court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized 
under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of 
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act 
or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act 
has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or his 
attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by 
agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for 
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes . 
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule corresponds Cross References . — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Delay in answering interrogatories. 
Expenses on failure to admit. 
—Failure to respond to requests. 
Failure to comply with order. 
—Arrest of party. 
Failure to appear at deposition. 
—Arrest of witness. 
Failure to produce documents. 
—Child custody modification. 
—Discretionary sanctions. 
—Dismissal without prejudice. 
—Exclusion of evidence. 
—Judgment. 
Failure to produce documents. 
—Production of expert witness. 
—Striking of answer. 
Jurisdiction. 
Failure to make discovery. 
—Court-ordered compliance. 
Belated response. 
—Default judgment. 
—Delay justified. 
—Summary judgment. 
Abuse of discretion. 
—Wilfulness. 
Order compelling discovery. 
—Award of expenses. 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
—Attorney fees. 
Cited. 
Delay in answer ing interrogatories 
Default judgment was proper against plain-
tiffs in a case that had been pending for years in 
which the untimeliness of plaintiffs' interroga-
tory answers effectively prevented defendant 
from undertaking follow-up discovery Schoney 
v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 R2d 1232 
(Utah 1990). 
Expenses on failure to admit 
—Fai lure to respond to requests 
This rule applies only to parties who unjus-
tifiably fail to admit facts but who nevertheless 
have responded to the request; by failing to 
respond at all, the facts are admitted under 
Subdivision (a), and Subdivision (c) does not 
apply. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1979). 
Failure to comply w i t h order 
—Arrest of party 
Fai lure to appear at depos i t ion 
Issuance of bench warrant for arrest of a 
party for failure to appear at a deposition is a 
matter within sound discretion of trial court, 
and its action will not be tampered with on 
appeal unless arbitrary, capricious, or a clear 
abuse of discretion. Bartholomew v. 
Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976). 
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—Arrest of witness 
Failure to produce documents 
Order for arrest of witness who refused to 
produce corporate minute book before notary 
authorized to take depositions, because witness 
deemed such book had no bearing on the trans-
action ipvolved in the suit, held unlawful. 
Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d 703 
(1940). 
—Child custody modification 
In a proceeding for modification of child cus-
tody, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in ordering discovery sanctions against mother 
who did not show that the orders were based on 
an erroneous conclusion of law or that they 
lacked any evidentiary basis; however, the 
court did abuse its discretion by modifying the 
custody order without taking evidence and 
making the necessary findings. Wright v. 
Wright, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
—Discretionary sanctions 
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an order 
of court or for failure to respond to discovery are 
discretionary with the court. G.M. Leasing Co. 
v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1975). 
A party's conduct merits sanctions under this 
rule if any of the following circumstances are 
found: (1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) 
the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court 
can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the 
party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics 
tending to frustrate the judicial process. 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 
(Utah 1997). 
Considering that the case had been set for 
trial four different times and that the court 
showed tremendous patience in allowing so 
many continuances for the plaintiff, who did 
nothing to show the court that he was inter-
ested in diligently prosecuting his case, the 
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing 
the case as a discovery sanction. Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 
1997). 
—Dismissal without prejudice 
Even though parties had agreed that if doc-
uments and answers to interrogatories were 
not made available by a certain date the action 
might be dismissed with prejudice, where the 
documents and information were not readily 
available, the trial court had discretion to dis-
miss action without prejudice. G.M. Leasing 
Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 
P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975). 
—Exclusion of evidence 
The trial court erred in excluding evidence on 
the basis that the defendants had failed to 
comply with orders regarding discovery since 
the evidence was not clearly included within 
the discovery request. Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). 
Because the trial court did not set a deadline 
for witness disclosure at a pretrial hearing at 
which the subject was discussed, the court 
abused its discretion when it excluded the tes-
timony of plaintiffs' expert witness. Berrett v. 
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct 
App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).' 
—Judgment 
Failure to produce documents 
Although granting judgment against party 
solely for failure to comply with discovery order 
was a stringent measure, trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding judgment to 
plaintiff where defendant did not comply with 
pretrial discovery order to produce documents 
supporting claim of discharge of promissory 
note. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 
97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964). 
Where defendant asserted her privilege 
against self-incrimination in refusing to appear 
and answer deposition questions and to pro-
duce documents as she had been ordered to do 
by the trial court, but made no showing on the 
record that the documents requested would be 
incriminatory, it was within the trial court's 
prerogative to strike defendant's pleadings and 
to enter a default judgment against her for her 
willful failure to respond to the discovery order 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 
P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). 
—Production of expert witness 
Trial court properly dismissed with prejudice 
defendant's counterclaims for legal malprac 
tice, where defendant failed to timely provide a 
court-ordered expert to establish the attorne> 
standard of care. Preston & Chambers, PC. v 
Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
—Striking of answer 
Jurisdiction 
An order striking the answer of an out-of 
state defendant, who submitted to the courts 
jurisdiction by filing an answer, and entering a 
default judgment for the plaintiff does not di 
vest the court of jurisdiction over the defen 
dant. Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1974). 
Failure to make discovery 
—Court-ordered compliance 
Subdivision (d) deals with situations in 
which the sanctions for failure to make discov-
ery provided for in Subdivision (b) may be 
applied by the court on the motion of the party 
seeking discovery without first ordering compli-
ance pursuant to Subdivision (a)(2). W.W. & 
WB. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Village, Inc., 568 
P2d 734 (Utah 1977). 
Belated response 
A party who has failed to serve answers to 
interrogatories within the time limit of Rule 33 
may not preclude the imposition of sanctions by 
serving belated answers in the interim between 
the filing of a motion for sanctions and the 
hearing on that motion. W.W. & WB. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park W. Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1977). 
—Default judgment 
The sanction of default judgment for failure 
to make discovery is justified where there has 
been a frustration of the judicial process, viz., 
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h e r e the failure to respond to discovery im-
* Hes trial on the merits and makes it impos-
P l i P to ascertain whether the allegations of the 
«wer have any factual merit. W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Village, Inc., 568 R2d 
734 (Utah 1977). 
lVial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ntenng a default judgment for a party's failure 
comply with the court's discovery order, 
•here the party did not demonstrate that his 
failure to produce personal tax returns was due 
to inability. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Default judgment is an unusually harsh 
sanction that should be meted out with caution. 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
In an eminent domain action by the Depart-
ment of Transportation, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in striking defendant's an-
swer and entering default against defendant 
who failed to respond to plaintiff's discovery 
request and, further, to numerous subsequent 
notices. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 
892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995). 
—Delay jus t i f ied 
Wife's delay in complying with discovery re-
quests in divorce action was "justified" where 
the record substantiated the difficulty both 
parties experienced in locating accurate records 
to substantiate their claims. Teece v. Teece, 715 
R2d 106 (Utah 1986). 
—Summary j u d g m e n t 
Abuse of d i s c r e t i on 
Where, after proper out-of-state service of 
process, defendant failed to appear to be de-
posed and produce documents, then failed to 
respond to plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment on account of his attorney's withdrawal 
from the case, entry of summary judgment for 
plaintiff six months later, after trial court or-
dered stricken the amended answer filed by 
defendant's new counsel, was an abuse of dis-
Utah L a w Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Br igham Young L a w Review. — The Use 
of a Rule 37(b)(2)(A) Sanction to Establish In 
Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
103. 
A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial 
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct 
at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the 
Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 B.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 793. 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 361 to 372. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 53, 68, 86. 
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to 
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Dismissal of state court action for failure or 
refusal of plaintiff to answer written interrog-
atories, 56 A.L.R.3d 1109. 
cretion. Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 
1976). 
—Wilfulness 
There is no reason to assume that the omis-
sion, by the 1972 amendment of Subdivision 
(d), of the word "wilfully" preceding "fails" in 
the first sentence (now Subdivision (d)(1)), was 
done with any deliberate purpose to effect a 
significant change in meaning or to confer any 
mandatory or arbitrary power on the court. 
Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976). 
Under Subdivision (d), sanctions are justified 
without reference to whether or not the unex-
cused failure to make discovery was wilful. 
W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Village, 
Inc., 568 P2d 734 (Utah 1977). 
Order compel l ing discovery 
—Award of expenses 
The sanction in Subdivision (a)(4), that the 
court may order a party to pay attorney's fees to 
the party obtaining an order compelling inspec-
tion of documents, is not mandatory and is not 
called for if the court finds that opposition to 
the motion for the order was substantially 
justified. Garrand v. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012 
(Utah 1978). 
Privi lege against self-incrimination 
—Attorney fees 
Where witness properly invokes his privilege 
against self-incrimination and refuses to an-
swer a question during pretrial discovery, the 
trial court may not order the witness to pay a 
party's attorney fees incurred in a motion to 
compel discovery. Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist. 
Court, 655 P.2d 665 (Utah 1982). 
Cited in Hatch v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 144, 442 
P.2d 467 (1968); Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97 
(Utah 1983); Synergetics ex rel. Lancer Indus., 
Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 
(Utah 1985). 
Construction and application of state statute 
or rule subjecting party making untrue allega-
tions or denials to payment of costs or attor-
neys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209. 
Attorney's conduct in delaying or obstructing 
discovery as basis for contempt proceeding, 8 
A.L.R.4th 1181. 
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court 
action for defendant's failure to obey request or 
order for production of documents or other 
objects, 26 A.L.R.4th 849. 
Dismissal of state court action for failure or 
refusal of plaintiff to obey request or order for 
production of documents or other objects, 27 
A.L.R.4th 61. 
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court 
action for defendant's failure to obey request or 
order to answer interrogatories or other discov-
ery questions, 30 A.L.R.4th 9. 
Dismissal of state court action for failure or 
refusal of plaintiff to appear or answer ques-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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tions at deposition or oral examination, 32 
A.L.R.4th 212. 
Sanctions for failure to make discovery under 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 38, F.R.C.P. 
Cross References. — Constitutional guar-
antee. Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10. 
Discretion to order jury trial in absence of 
Damages. 
Demand. 
—Absence. 
—Time. 
Right preserved. 
—Appeal from industrial commission. 
—Court's discretion. 
Waiver. 
—Failure to make written demand. 
Cited. 
Damages 
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue of 
damages once default has been entered. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Demand 
—Absence 
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
jury trial to defendant under Rule 39(b) over 
plaintiff's objections although defendant had 
not made proper demand for jury trial under 
this rule, where plaintiff was not prejudiced 
thereby. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390R2d 127(1964). 
—Time 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 37 as affected by 
defaulting party's good faith attempts to com 
ply, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 811. 
demand, U.R.C.R 39(b). 
Fees of jurors, § 21-5-1 et seq. 
Jury provisions generally, § 78-46-1 et seq. 
Statutory right to jury trial, § 78-21-1. 
denying party's request for a jury trial made 
four days prior to trial in violation of district 
court practice rule requiring such request to be 
made at least 10 days before trial. Dyson v 
Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 593 R2d 143 (Utah 
1979) (decided before 1986 amendment added 
ten-day requirement). 
Right preserved 
—Appeal from industrial commission 
This trial rule is not applicable to trial de 
novo in the district court on appeal from indus-
trial commission's decision on a sex discrimina-
tion in employment case. Beehive Medical 
Elecs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P2d 53 
(Utah 1978). 
—Court's discretion 
When exists as to whether a cause should be 
regarded as one in equity or one in law, wherein 
the party can insist on a jury as a matter o 
right, the trial court may examine the nature o 
the rights asserted and the remedies sought m 
the light of the facts of the case to ascertain 
which predominates and, from that determina 
tion, make the appropriate order as to a JurJ . 
nonjury trial. Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d 3bi 
517 P.2d 1318 (1974). 
PART VI. TRIALS 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution 
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of 
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the 
party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the 
issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have 
demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by 
jury for only some of the issues, any other party, within 10 days after service 
of the demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand 
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand 
as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a 
waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein 
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP F. COXEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FEDERAL ORDER OF EAGLES, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
& 
ORDER 
Case Number: 980907047 PI 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS: 
Plaintiff filed a timely Motion for a New Trial after a jury verdict was returned in favor 
of the defendant no cause of action. The court ruled in open court denying the Motion on two 
grounds and took under advisement whether to grant a new trial based on the alleged error of 
allowing a defense expert to testify at trial. 
Plaintiff argues that the court erred in allowing Melvin Capehart to testify at trial on 
behalf of the defense on the issue of liability. Plaintiff contends that the defense failed to provide 
an expert report to plaintiff and failed to supplement its answers to interrogatories identifying 
Melvin Capehart as an expert who would be called at trial. 
The history of plaintiff s discovery requests that relate to the issue of defense experts is 
critical to the courts analysis and is as follows. Plaintiff served a First Set of Interrogatories 
asking: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Please set forth with specificity whether or 
not the Defendant has hired any individuals skilled in the field of electricity 
and/or wiring and if in the affirmative please set forth the name, address, phone 
number and curriculum vitae of said individuals. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE: (dated June 29,1999): Defendant has 
consulted with Melvin Capehart, MSEE, of Fay Engineering Corp., 5201 East 48th 
Avenue, Denver, CO. 80216,telephone (303)333-5209...However, Defendant has 
not yet determined if either of these individuals will be called to testify at trial. 
INTERROGATOR NO. 27: Please set forth with specificity the names of 
all experts presently known to Defendant that may be called at the time of trial. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE: Defendant has not yet determined which 
experts, if any, it will call at trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Please set forth with respect to each such 
expert witness a brief description of the testimony anticipated from such expert. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER: See answer to Interrogator No. 27, above. 
Plaintiff also served a First Request for Production of Documents which included a general 
request for "reports of any other investigator or individual(s) having information concerning 
Plaintiffs claim." Defendant entered a general objection and then indicated that it did not have 
any such reports other than medical records Defendant then filed an "Initial Designation of 
Witnesses" dated August 25, 2000 in which it again identified Melvin Capehart, MSEE, as a 
witness that "may be called at trial". In a letter dated May 3, 2001 plaintiffs counsel states: "Also, 
in light of your letter of March 21,2001 and your prior identification of Dr. John Foley and 
Melvin Capehart as prospective witnesses I would request copies of all reports by them.11 The 
letter goes on to state that "I sense the cause of his injury is not an issue. If we can reach a 
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stipulation acceptable to us both in this regard, the issues presented in this case can be 
narrowed." 
It is undisputed that no written response to this letter was given to plaintiffs counsel by 
the defense. However, the defense claims that through its legal assistant, Jean Layton, plaintiffs 
counsel's secretary was contacted and told that there were no reports to send and that they would 
not stipulate to causation. At the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, Mr. Perkins, counsel for 
plaintiff, asserted that he never received that message. 
By letter dated May 29,2002 counsel for defendant confirmed that the attorneys would 
meet on June 10,2002 for an attorney conference. Mr. Lund, defense counsel, asserts by 
affidavit that he met with Mr. Perkins and they discussed "potential witnesses for the upcoming 
trial." Mr. Lund goes on to assert that he brought with him to that meeting "a document entitled 
'Potential Witnesses for Trial' which lists Mr. Mel Capehart". There is no statement by Mr. 
Lund that he gave Mr. Perkins a copy of that document nor does he claim to have specifically 
identified Mr. Capehart as a witness at that meeting. Mr. Perkins at the hearing adamantly 
denied that there was any discussion at that meeting about Mr. Capehart testifying. It is 
undisputed that the defense did not supplement their discovery responses and did not provide a 
curriculum vitae of Mr. Capehart nor a "brief description of the testimony anticipated" from him. 
At tnal over the objection of plaintiff s counsel the court allowed Mr. Capehart to 
testify.Plaintiff argued at trial that he was taken by surprise that Mr. Capehart was called as a 
witness, argued that he had never been furnished a report as required by Rule 26, and asserted 
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that the discovery responses by defendant had not been adequately supplemented. Defense 
counsel argued that they had adequately identified Mr. Capehart as a witness that they likely 
would call at trial and further argued that the 1999 amendments to Rule 26 requiring them to 
furnish an expert report did not apply to this case because the case was filed in 1998. At trial the 
court did not have before it the detailed chronology of events relating to the disclosure regarding 
Mr. Capehart as a witness that it now has. Instead the court focused on whether the 1998 or 1999 
version of Rule 26 should apply to this case. The court ruled that the defense was not obligated 
to furnish a written report because the case was filed in 1998 not in 1999 when the new Rule 26 
went into effect. It also relied on counsel's representation that they had given a written 
disclosure that Mr. Capehart may be called as a witness at trial in their Initial Designation of 
Witnesses. 
Defense counsel argues now and argued at trial that the amendments to Rule 26 requiring 
expert reports is "only applicable to cases filed on or after November 1,1999." Utah Court Rules 
Annotated 86 (2002) and, therefore, plaintiff cannot rely on the failure to furnish a written report 
by Mr. Capehart as a basis for a new trial. Next the defense concedes that the 1998 version of 
Rule 26 requires a party to supplement discovery responses with respect to "(1) identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, (2) the subject matter on which he is 
expected to testify, and (3) the substance of his testimony." However, the defense asserts that 
"(d)efendant's disclosures to plaintiff substantially served the purposes behind these three 
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supplementation requirements. "The defense goes on to state that "(t)he general substance of 
such testimony should have also been obvious: Plaintiff knew that Mr. Capehart might offer 
expert opinion favorable to Defendant on electrical/wiring issues." Further argument of the 
defense is that plaintiff is precluded from alleging surprise because he did not use "ordinary 
prudence" to prevent surprise as required by Rule 59. The final argument of the defense is that 
Mr. Capehart testified only as to causation, not negligence, and since the Special Verdict shows 
that the jury reached a finding of no neghgence and did not, therefore, need to reach the question 
regarding causation, any error in allowing Mr. Capehart to testify is harmless error. 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: 
The court finds that the defense had no obligation under the 1998 version of Rule 26 to 
furnish plaintiff with a written report by Mr. Capehart if he had not prepared one. However, the 
court finds that the defense did have an obligation under the 1998 version of Rule 26 to 
supplement its discovery responses to provide a curriculum vitae of Mr. Capehart as well as a 
brief description of his anticipated testimony at trial. It is undisputed that the defense did not 
supplement its discovery responses. The argument that the defense substantially complied with 
Rule 26 is not reasonable. Given the fact that there was at best confusion with regard to whether 
Mr. Capehart would testify at trial (i.e, at no time did the defense indicate that it "will call" Mr. 
Capehart), had the defense supplemented their discovery responses with a summary of his 
anticipated trial testimony as required by the rule that confusion would have likely been 
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eliminated. At least the argument that the plaintiff was surprised that Mr. Capehart was called as 
a witness would have carried substantially less weight with the court. It is simply not reasonable 
to put the burden on the party requesting discovery to read between the lines in response to its 
questions. Even if one were to assume that Mr. Capehart would testify about wiring and 
electricity and that his testimony would be favorable to the defense, an answer as general as that 
if put in a formal written supplemental response would have been subject to a Motion to 
Compel. Essentially an answer like that tells one nothing. 
As to the issue of whether plaintiff used "ordinary prudence" to prevent surprise, the court 
finds that under all the circumstances and surrounding facts, plaintiff did not fall short on this 
standard. Plaintiff requested that defendant identify all experts that may be called at trial and 
followed up with defendant with a letter later in the discovery process asking for a report from 
Mr. Capehart. While it is true that defendant identified Mr. Capehart twice as a potential witness 
at trial, it also stated in response to the First Set of Interrogatories that it had not yet determined 
which, if any, experts it would call at trial. It is also true that although defendant now states that 
it is only obligated to follow the Rule 26 discovery requirements in effect in 1998, it filed an 
Initial Disclosure of Witnesses under Rule 26 as amended in 1999. This could have added to the 
confusion about which version of Rule 26 defendant was acting on and may have added to the 
confusion about whether Mr. Capehart was going to be called as a witness since no report was 
forthcoming as required by the amended rule. While it is possible that the identity of experts was 
discussed at the attorney conference on June 10, 2002, plaintiffs counsel insists that Mr. 
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Capehart was never discussed at that meeting and that he was under the impression that Mr. 
Capehart would not be called. With regard to the defense response to plaintiffs letter requesting 
expert reports, the court finds that no written response was given and it is not reasonable to 
assume that a phone call from a legal assistant to a secretary was sufficient to put counsel on 
notice. Mr. Perkins states that he was never given the information from his secretary. Had the 
response been in writing it may have bolstered the defense position that they had given enough 
information to place Mr. Perkins on notice as to the likehhood that Mr. Capehart would be called 
as a witness. 
Plaintiff states that he would have taken Mr. Capehart's deposition to prepare for cross 
examination and possibly would have retained a rebuttal expert had he known of the impending 
testimony at trial. The defense argues that plaintiff did nothing to adequately prepare for Mr. 
Capehart's testimony despite being placed on notice that he may be a witness. The problem with 
Mr. Capehart particularly is that he resides in Denver, Colorado. The time, effort, and cost 
associated with taking the deposition of an out of state expert witness is substantial. From 
plaintiffs perspective Mr. Capehart was not identified as a witness that would be called at trial. 
It is not reasonable to expect that the expense of an out of state expert deposition should be 
incurred if the witness has not been definitively identified as one who will be called at trial.lt is 
difficult to analyze this issue without reference to the preceding paragraph which outlines the 
confusion regarding whether Mr. Capehart would be called at trial. Again, had the defense 
supplemented their discovery and stated what the proposed testimony would be, the confusion 
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would be dispelled and the deposition likely would have been taken. 
The defense finally argues that the jury likely did not rely on Mr. Capehart's testimony 
because he testified regarding causation of injury, not negligence and, therefore, any error in 
allowing Mr. Capehart to testify is harmless. Plaintiff disputes that Mr. Capehart's testimony 
was so limited and argues that" his testimony that a shock should be so insignificant as to not 
cause any injury in light of his demonstration to the jury, also addresses either directly or by 
implication that such an insignificant shock is not of the magnitude that a campground would 
have to guard against it in protecting individuals using their campground facilities. Obviously a 
campground has a greater duty to inspect and cure electrical problems if a dangerous situation is 
created or exists as to a situation where at most a person receives a minor shock." 
The court finds plaintiffs argument persuasive. The jury was specifically instructed that 
negligence "means the failure to use reasonable care." (Instruction No. 23) Jury Instruction No. 
24 goes on to describe that reasonable care depends on the situation and the danger involved. 
Jury Instruction No. 27 describes the duties owed to a business visitor (invitee) and discusses 
dangerous defects . There clearly is some crossover between testimony on causation, degree of 
shock associated with the condition, and a duty to discover and exercise reasonable care such that 
one cannot make a clear delineation that puts Mr. Capehart's testimony solely in the category of 
causation. 
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RULING: 
Given all of the factors discussed above, the court concludes that plaintiff was unfairly 
surprised that Mr. Capehart was called as a witness at trial and was, therefore, prevented from 
adequately preparing a challenge to his testimony both in the form of cross examination and 
rebuttal testimony. Ordinary prudence, under the unique facts of this case including the history 
of discovery, was exercised by plaintiff. la hindsight the court recognizes that it was prejudicial 
error to allow Mr. Capehart to testify and that the plaintiff was prejudiced as a result. Mr. 
Capehart was clearly an important defense witness. Therefore, the court orders that a new trial is 
granted. Counsel shall request a telephone conference with the court to schedule new dates for 
further discovery if necessary and to set a new trial date. 
DATED this JO day of January, 2003. 
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP F. COXEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES, Aerie 
No. 2472, 
Defendant. 
DECISION AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
Case Number: 980907047 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
It is hereby ordered that plaintiffs case is dismissed with prejudice. After reflection from the 
decision given in open court, the court has determined not to reinstate the original verdict from 
the first trial, but rather accomplish essentially the same thing by simply dismissing the case. 
Procedurally, this is probably the more appropriate way to handle the disposition in this case. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
1. The incident from which this case arose occurred on or about May 30, 1997. 
2. Plaintiff claims that he suffered an electrical shock and disabling injuries from an alleged 
faulty electrical outlet at a campground operated by defendant. 
3. The case finally proceeded to trial in June, 2002. 
4. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, no cause of action. 
5. Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial claiming among other things that his trial was unfair 
because one of the defendant's expert witnesses was allowed to testify at trial over his objection. 
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6. Plaintiff claimed that the defense expert was a surprise witness at trial because defendant had 
not given adequate notice of its intent to call the expert and had not provided a report nor 
supplemented its discovery responses adequately to appraise plaintiff of the expert's anticipated 
testimony. 
7. The court granted a new trial on the basis essentially of technical violations of discovery rules 
that may have resulted in some unfairness to plaintiff at trial. 
8. Essentially the court concluded that there may have been inadequate disclosure of defendant's 
intent to call the expert and inadequate disclosure of the expert's anticipated testimony prior to 
trial. 
9. At no time did the court find that the defense acted in bad faith but basically concluded that 
there had been a breakdown in communication that may have resulted in possible prejudice to 
plaintiff. 
10. The new trial was intended to narrowly allow plaintiff to depose the "surprise" expert and 
obtain a rebuttal expert to that expert testimony if necessary and otherwise retry the case as the 
first case had been tried. 
11. Before the start of the second trial, plaintiff retained a new attorney. 
12. On February 23, 2004, at the end of the first day of the second trial, plaintiffs new attorney 
expressed an intent to offer exhibits that had not been offered at the first trial and that had not 
been disclosed in discovery despite defendant's discovery request. 
13. Among those proposed exhibits were a series of photographs developed as still images from 
a videotape taken by plaintiffs wife the day following the incident (i.e., May 31, 1997). 
14. The photographs depicted scenes from the campground and plaintiffs physical injuries on 
his arm alleged to have resulted from the electrical shock. 
15. Included in the videotape was also a shot of the camper trailer parked next to plaintiff in the 
campground which revealed clearly the license plate number of the trailer of that camper. 
16. This adjacent camper had purportedly used the top portion of the same electrical outlet used 
by plaintiff during the incident in question. 
17. Prior to the time of the revelation of this videotape, no information was available to the 
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defendant that would have allowed him to find the "mystery" camper parked adjacent to plaintiff 
and to interview him or her. 
18. Defendant protested at the second trial that he had not been provided the exhibits prior to 
trial as requested, and had never been told that a videotape even existed. 
19. Subsequent to the 1997 incident, one of defendant's campground caretakers died and was, 
therefore, precluded from observing and assessing the information in the videotape. 
20. Also, prior to the revelation of the videotape, the nurse who was in the emergency room 
where plaintiff was seen after the incident moved out of the state and may not have been 
available to review the videotape of plaintiff s injuries in order to compare her observations. 
21. Defendant had served on plaintiff a Request for Production of documents early in the case 
asking for the production of relevant photographs. 
22. Plaintiff answered the Request for Production and produced only two photographs which 
had not been derived from the videotape. 
23. During depositions of plaintiff and his wife, questions were posed about photographs taken 
and neither disclosed that a videotape had been taken. 
24.. Plaintiff did not produce the videotape nor disclose its existence until the end of the first day 
of the second trial. 
25. Presumably plaintiffs second attorney assumed that the videotape had already been 
produced by plaintiffs first counsel. 
26. Defendant claimed that plaintiff failed to disclose in violation of Rule 37 of the U.R C.P. 
and asked the court to dismiss the plaintiffs case as a sanction and to reinstate the original "no 
cause" verdict. 
27. Upon the filing of defendant's Motion for Sanctions the court excused the jury for the day 
and allowed counsel time to do some research and to prepare whatever explanation plaintiff had 
regarding the videotape. 
28 A hearing was held later that day for the parties to present whatever evidence they had and to 
present legal arguments. 
29 Plaintiffs second attorney preferred that the first attorney received the videotape from his 
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clients early in the case but decided that it was not admissible and simply shelved it. 
30. Neither the first attorney nor the plaintiff and his wife were present at the hearing to answer 
questions of the court or to testify as to their explanation of events. 
31. The court found that the failure to disclose the videotape was at a minimum the result of 
wilful conduct on the part of plaintiff s first counsel and found that fault existed in violating the 
discovery rules. 
32. The court determined that plaintiffs failure to disclose the videotape was an egregious 
discovery violation and that under the particular circumstances of this case justified the extreme 
remedy of dismissal of his case. 
33. There may have been additional factual and legal findings given on the record in open court 
and to the extent they are necessary or useful in the event of review of this decision, they are 
incorporated herein. 
ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATION OF DECISION: 
The history of this case is very unusual. Plaintiff who was allowed the extraordinary remedy 
of putting on a second trial after losing the first one, now stands before the court accused of 
having committed a far more egregious breach of discovery rules than defendant did during the 
first trial which breach justified the granting of the second trial. 
Ironically, the wrongdoing by plaintiff existed during the first trial, unbeknownst to the 
defendant or the court, and continued into the second trial. The irony, of course, is that while 
claiming wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, plaintiff was in fact guilty of far more 
egregious conduct than the defendant. The plaintiff while taking full advantage of the equitable 
treatment by the court in granting a new trial was in fact not in a position to claim unfair 
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treatment. Defendant suggested at the hearing that if the court had known of this wrongdoing by 
plaintiff, it would not have granted a new trial. While it is somewhat speculative to conclude 
that, the court acknowledges that it certainly would have been unlikely to have granted the rare 
and extreme relief of a new trial had it known after the first trial of this failure to disclose 
material evidence requested by the opposing side in discovery. 
Case law relied on by the court in making its decision to dismiss the plaintiffs case as a 
sanction is abundantly clear and consistent that the trial court is in a position to accurately assess 
all the facts and weigh the gravity of factors and should be granted considerable discretion in 
detennining the appropriate sanction for violation of discovery rules. This court also recognizes 
that the ultimate sanction of dismissal of a case with prejudice should be used sparingly, with 
restraint, and only in the most appropriate cases. This is one of those cases. 
The standard to be applied before imposing this sanction is that there must be a showing of 
"willfulness, bad faith, or fault" UDOT v. Osguthorpe, et al., 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995). 
Furthermore, a showing of willfulness means "any intentional failure as distinguished from 
involuntary noncompliance...No wrongful intent need be shown." UDOT, supra, at 4. 
The court in UDOT, supra, goes on to note, however, that "(t)he courts, in the interest of justice, 
and fair play, favor, where possible, full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits in 
every case." Having said that, the court in UDOT, supra, affirmed the trials court's decision to 
strike the defendant's answer and enter a default where the defendant did not comply repeatedly 
with discovery requests. 
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While there are cases where the trial court dismissed a case for repeated failures to comply 
with discovery and repeated acts by a party that frustrated the judicial process, the standard 
should not necessarily be the quantity of acts of wrongdoing by a party. Certainly, the trial court 
should be granted latitude to assess the wrongdoing in the context of the history of the case, the 
degree of seriousness of the wrongdoing, the timing of the discovery of the wrongdoing, and the 
impact the wrongdoing has on the opposing party's case in deciding what the appropriate 
sanction should be. 
In the instant case, first, the court notes that Rule 37(f) of URCP states in pertinent part that if 
there is a failure to disclose: 
"that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing 
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. 
In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including 
payment of reasonable costs and attorneys fees, any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) 
or (C) and informing the jury of the failure to disclose." 
Among the sanctions under subpart (b) is that the court may dismiss the action. 
The proffer of explanation to the court by plaintiffs second attorney demonstrates that the 
failure to disclose was wilful and that there was fault associated with it. Specifically, it was 
represented that the videotape was not produced to defense counsel because plaintiffs attorney 
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did not think it would be admitted into evidence. The videotape was simply put away in a 
drawer and not produced. While no bad motive is imputed by the court to this conduct, clearly it 
was a wilful act. It was not represented to be simply inadvertence or mistake but rather a 
conscious decision not to produce it. The previous discussion regarding what constitutes wilful 
behavior for purposes of assessing a sanction for discovery violation makes clear that it is not 
necessary to conclude that there was a "wrongful intent" but rather that there was intentional 
behavior rather than something that was involuntary. Furthermore, fault can be assessed because 
even though a piece of evidence is ultimately deemed not admissible in court during trial or some 
other proceeding that does not make it non discoverable. That was an error in judgment and can 
be deemed to be faulty. Furthermore, the plaintiff and his wife were questioned during their 
depositions about photographs, and they did not disclose the videotape. Again, although there 
may not have been an improper motive, certainly that conduct can be deemed to be wilful and 
faulty. This is significant then because both plaintiffs attorney and the plaintiff himself were 
involved in the failure to disclose this videotape. 
In connection with this, plaintiffs second counsel argues that photographs rather than a video 
lape were requested and, therefore, technically the videotape did not need to be produced. They 
also argue that a lay person might make a distinction between a videotape and photographs and 
that this may explain why plaintiff did not disclose the videotape in his deposition when asked 
about photographs. The argument is specious. A videotape is simply a series of photos that may 
be put into motion using a machine. If either plaintiffs first attorney or plaintiff in his 
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deposition made that hyper technical distinction the court wonders if bad motive should in fact 
be attributed in this case. 
The timing of the disclosure of the videotape relative to the time it was requested is also 
important. The disclosure occurred during the second trial in this case in February 2004. The 
request for photographs was made sometime before March 29, 1999. In the interim plaintiff had 
a full trial which he lost. The granting of the new trial was based on a technical violation of 
discovery by the defense and at best was the result of miscommunications between counsel. The 
videotape was not a piece of evidence created shortly before the first or second trial but was 
created on May 31, 1997-approximately five years before the first trial and seven years before 
the second trial and one day after the incident. 
Furthermore, the videotape contained material information. It shows many shots of the 
campground, the electrical outlets including the one involved in this incident, plaintiffs injuries 
to his arm, and astonishingly reveals the identity by license plate number of the camper parked 
next to plaintiff who purportedly used the same electrical outlet at issue and who may have had 
personal knowledge of the events at issue. The information revealed in the videotape was not 
otherwise available to defense counsel and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as of marginal 
importance. 
Defense counsel also points out that they were precluded from showing the videotape to one 
campground caretaker because that person died before the disclosure of the tape. The nurse who 
had information about plaintiffs injuries has since moved out of state. Her deposition was read 
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at (rial in lieu of her live testimony. Clearly, there is potential irreversible prejudice to the 
defense by the untimely production of the videotape and the disappearance of witnesses. 
The timing of the production of the videotape is also important. It was not disclosed until the 
conclusion of the first day of trial during the SECOND trial. To simply say, plaintiff should not 
be allowed to use any of the evidence including still shots developed from the tape is no remedy 
to the prejudice caused to the defense nor is the failure to disclose harmless. To do as plaintiff 
suggested, that is to send the jury home and allow additional time for discovery, also is not a 
viable option particularly in light of the fact that the defense was now having to try the case for 
the second time and everyone was well into that second trial. To require the defense to regroup, 
reopen discovery, and have to prepare for a third trial would not be appropriate or fair. 
Furthermore, the passage of time and the disappearance of at least two of the defense's witnesses 
may have created irreparable prejudice to the defense in preparing its case. There is also a 
question about whether the mystery camper could now be identified and located with the stale 
information from the videotape. 
Finally, it is understandable that appellate courts frown upon sanctions that preclude a party 
from presenting his or her case in court. It is an onerous penalty that should be reserved for the 
most extreme misconduct. In this case, however, it should be remembered that plaintiff has 
already had his day in court. The first trial that he had was not stopped short of a jury verdict. 
That verdict found in favor of the defendant. The decision to grant a new trial was based on a 
technical violation that was deemed more a miscommunication between the parties than anything 
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else. Defendant argued that plaintiffs counsel was negligent in not following through and also 
argued that they had in fact given the information to plaintiff. At any rate, the remedy of a new 
trial was afforded to plaintiff because of a possible technical violation of the discovery rules. To 
now stand before the court accused of withholding material evidence in the case for nearly seven 
years through a second trial when they availed themselves of the equity and mercy of the court in 
asking for a new trial based on far less egregious violations of the discovery rules is 
unconscionable. That puts this case in a unique posture. It is a posture in which plaintiff is not 
entitled to avail themselves of remedies such as "starting over" with discovery and a third trial. 
They simply stand with unclean hands before the court after having been given an opportunity 
for a second trial that they may not have deserved to begin with. 
Given the potential irreversible prejudice to defendant, the fact that plaintiff was allowed a 
second chance at his case through the granting of a new trial, the timing of the revelation of the 
videotape, the lack of good reason or excuse for not producing the videotape and the inequity of 
allowing plaintiff the equitable remedy of a new trial when they stood before the court with 
unclean hands justifies the court's decision to say " enough is enough" and that it is time to 
simply terminate this case by dismissal. 
Dated this lQ day of March, 2004. 
District Court Judge 
i/flEPFE 
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